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1 Finite ﬁelds
1.1 Generalities
Deﬁnition 1.1 A ﬁnite ﬁeld is an algebraic system consisting of a ﬁnite set F together
with two binary operations + and , deﬁned on F , satisfying the following axioms:
 F is an abelian group with respect to “+”
 Fnf0g is an abelian group with respect to “”
 distributive: for all x; y and z in F we have:
x (y + z) = (x y) + (x z)
(x+ y) z = (x z) + (y  z):
Deﬁnition 1.2 The order of a ﬁnite ﬁeld F is the number of elements in F . Is is denoted
by jF j.
Theorem 1.3 There exists a ﬁnite ﬁeld of order q if and only if q is a prime power. In
addition, if q is a prime power, then there is essentially only one ﬁnite ﬁeld of order q;
this ﬁeld is denoted by Fq.
Deﬁnition 1.4 If q = pm, where p is a prime and m a positive integer, then p is called
the characteristic of Fq and m is called the extension degree of Fq.
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1.2 The ﬁnite ﬁeld Fpm
Let p be a prime number. The ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, with q = pm, called a characteristic p ﬁnite
ﬁeld, can be viewed as a vector space of dimension m over Fp. That is, there exists a set
of m elements f0; 1; :::; m 1g in Fpm such that each a 2 Fpm can be written uniquely
in the form
a =
m 1X
i=0
aii; where i 2 0; 1; :::; p  1:
The set f0; 1; :::; m 1g is called a basis of Fpm over Fp. We can then represent a as the
bit string [am 1am 2:::a0]. Addition of ﬁeld elements is performed by bitwise XOR-ing
the vector representations. The multiplication rule depends on the basis selected.
There are many diﬀerent bases of Fpm over Fp. Some bases lead to more eﬃcient
software or hardware implementations of the arithmetic in Fpm than other bases. The two
most commonly used kinds of bases are polynomial bases and normal bases.
1.2.1 Polynomial basis representation
Deﬁnition 1.5 Let f(x) = xm +
Pm 1
i=0 fix
i (where fi 2 0; 1; :::; p  1) be an irreducible
polynomial of degree m over Fp, that is, f(x) cannot be factored as a product of two
polynomials over Fp, each of degree lesser than m; f(x) is called the reduction polynomial.
For each reduction polynomial there exists a polynomial basis representation.
Field elements. The ﬁnite ﬁeld Fpm is comprised of all polynomials over Fp of degree
less than m:
Fpm =

am 1xm 1 + :::+ a1x+ a0 : ai 2 f0; 1; :::; p  1g
	
:
The ﬁeld element am 1xm 1+:::+a1x+a0 is usually denoted by the bit string [am 1:::a1 a0]
of length m, so that
Fpm = f[am 1:::a1 a0] : ai 2 f0; 1; :::; p  1gg :
Deﬁnition 1.6 The following operations are deﬁned on the elements of Fpm when using a
polynomial representation with reduction polynomial f(x). Assume that a = [am 1:::a1a0]
and b = [bm 1:::b1b0].
 Addition: a+ b = c = [cm 1:::c1c0], where ci  ai + bi(mod p).
 Multiplication: a  b = c = [cm 1:::c1c0], where c(x) =
Pm 1
i=0 cix
i is the remainder of
the division of the polynomial (
Pm 1
i=0 aix
i)(
Pm 1
i=0 bix
i) by f(x) over Fp.
 Inversion: if a is a non-zero element in Fpm, the inverse of a, denoted by a 1, is
the unique element c 2 Fpm for which a  c = 1.
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Example 1.7 Let p = 2, i.e. F = F2m is a binary ﬁnite ﬁeld and f(x) = x3+x+1. This
polynomial is irreducible. Indeed, f(0) = f(1) = 0, hence f has no zero’s on F2. Since
f(x) is a polynomial of degree 3, the elements of F23 can be written as a2x2 + a1x + a0,
with ai 2 F2 for i = 1; 2; 3.
Moreover,
(a2x
2 + a1x+ a0)(b2x
2 + b1x+ b0)
= a2b2x
4 + (a2b1 + a1b2)x
3 + (a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2)x
2 + (a1b0 + a0b1)x+ a0b0
= (a2b2 + a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2)x
2 + (a2b2 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a1b0 + a0b1)x
+a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b0;
since
x3  x+ 1 (mod x3 + x+ 1)
and consequently
x4  x2 + x (mod x3 + x+ 1)
Hence,
[a2a1a0]  [b2b1b0] = [a2b2 + a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2
a2b2 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a1b0 + a0b1 a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b0]:
Example 1.8 (A polynomial basis representation of the ﬁnite ﬁeld F24) Let f(x) =
x4 + x+ 1 be the reduction polynomial. Then the 16 elements of F24 are:
0 [0000] x3 [1000]
1 [0001] x3 + 1 [1001]
x [0010] x3 + x [1010]
x+ 1 [0011] x3 + x+ 1 [1011]
x2 [0100] x3 + x2 [1100]
x2 + 1 [0101] x3 + x2 + 1 [1101]
x2 + x [0110] x3 + x2 + x [1110]
x2 + x+ 1 [0111] x3 + x2 + x+ 1 [1111]
Examples of the arithmetic operations in F24 are:
[1101] + [1001] = [0100].
[1101]  [1001] = [1111], since (x3 + x2 + 1)  (x3 + 1) = x6 + x5 + x2 + 1  x3 + x2 + x+ 1
mod (x4 + x+ 1).
[1101] 1 = [0100].
The element  = [0100] is a generator of F24 since its order is 15 as the following
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calculations show:
1 = [0010] 2 = [0100] 3 = [1000]
4 = [0011] 5 = [0110] 6 = [1100]
7 = [1011] 8 = [0101] 9 = [1010]
10 = [0111] 11 = [1110] 12 = [1111]
13 = [1101] 14 = [1001] 15 = [0001]
Selecting a reduction polynomial. The following procedure is commonly used to choose a
reduction polynomial: if an irreducible trinomial xm+xk+1, where 1  k  m  1 exists
over F2, then the reduction polynomial f(x) is chosen to be the irreducible trinomial with
the lowest-degree middle term xk. If no irreducible trinomial exists, then select instead a
pentanomial xm + xk3 + xk2 + xk1 + 1, where 1  k1 < k2 < k3  m  1, such that k3 has
the minimal value, the value of k2 is minimal for the given k3 and k1 is minimal for the
given k3 and k2.
1.2.2 The ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp
Deﬁnition 1.9 Let p be a prime number. The ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp, called a prime ﬁeld consists
of the set of integers
f0; 1; :::; p  1g
with the following arithmetic operations:
 addition: if a; b 2 Fp; then a  b = r, where r is the remainder of the division of a+ b
by p and 0  r  p  1. This operation is called addition modulo p.
 multiplication: if a; b 2 Fp, then a  b = s, where s is the remainder of the division
of a  b by p and 0  r  p  1. This operation is called multiplication modulo p.
 inversion: if a is a non-zero element in Fp, the inverse of a modulo p, denoted a 1,
is the unique integer c 2 Fp for which a  c = 1.
Example 1.10 (The ﬁnite ﬁeld F23) The elements of F23 are 1; 2; :::; 22. Examples of the
arithmetic operations in F23 are: (1) 12 + 20 = 9; (2) 8  9 = 3; (3) 8 1 = 3.
There are certain primes p for which the modular reduction can be computed very eﬃ-
ciently. For example, let p be the prime 2192 264 1. To reduce a positive integer n < p2,
write
n =
5X
j=0
Aj  264j:
Then,
n  T + S1 + S2 + S3 (mod p);
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where
T = A2  2128 + A1  264 + A0
S1 = A3  264 + A3
S2 = A4  2128 + A4  264
S3 = A5  2128 + A5  264 + A5:
2 Elliptic curves
2.1 Elliptic curves over Fp
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let p > 3 be an odd prime and let a; b 2 Fp satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 6 0 (mod
p). Then an elliptic curve E(Fp) over Fp deﬁned by the parameters a; b 2 Fp consists of
the set of solutions or points P = (x; y) for x; y 2 Fp to the equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b
together with a special point O called the point at inﬁnity. For a given point P = (xP ; yP ),
xp is called the x-coordinate of P and yP is called the y-coordinate of P . Fp is called a
prime ﬁnite ﬁeld.
On an elliptic curve E(Fp) over a ﬁeld Fp can be deﬁned a binary operation + as
follows:
1. P +O = O + P = P , for all P 2 E(Fp).
2. If P = (x; y) 2 E(Fp), then (x; y) + (x; y) = O. The point (x; y) 2 E(Fp) is
denoted  P and is called the negative of P .
3. Let P = (x1; y1) 2 E(Fp) and Q = (x2; y2) 2 E(Fp), where P 6= Q. Then
P +Q = (x3; y3), where
x3 = 
2   x1   x2; y3 = (x1   x3)  y1; and  = y2   y1
x2   x1 :
4. Let P = (x1; y1) 2 E(Fp). Then P + P = 2P = (x3; y3), where
x3 = 
2   2x1; y3 = (x1   x3)  y1; and  = 3x
2
1 + a
2y1
:
This operation is called the doubling of a point.
Thus
 
E(Fp);+

forms an abelian group.
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2.2 Elliptic curves over F2m
Deﬁnition 2.2 A (non-supersingular) elliptic curve E(F2m) over F2m deﬁned by the pa-
rameters a; b 2 F2m ; b 6= 0 consists of the set of solutions or points P = (x; y) for
x; y 2 F2m to the equation:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
together with a special point O called the point at inﬁnity. For a given point P = (xP ; yP ),
xp is called the x-coordinate of P and yP is called the y-coordinate of P . F2m is called a
characteristic 2 ﬁnite ﬁeld.
On an elliptic curve E(Fp) over a ﬁeld Fp can be deﬁned a binary operation + as
follows:
1. P +O = O + P = P , for all P 2 E(F2m).
2. If P = (x; y) 2 E(F2m), then (x; y) + (x; y) = O. The point (x; y) 2 E(F2m) is
denoted  P and is called the negative of P .
3. Let P = (x1; y1) 2 E(F2m) and Q = (x2; y2) 2 E(F2m), where P 6= Q. Then
P +Q = (x3; y3), where
x3 = 
2 + + x1 + x2 + a; y3 = (x1 + x3) + x3 + y1; and  =
y2 + y1
x2 + x1
:
4. Let P = (x1; y1) 2 E(F2m). Then P + P = 2P = (x3; y3), where
x3 = 
2 + + a; y3 = (x1 + x3) + x3 + y1; and  = x1 +
x1
y1
:
This operation is called the doubling of a point.
Thus
 
E(Fp);+

forms an abelian group.
2.2.1 Properties
The central operation of cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) is the elliptic scalar multiplication (operation analogue of the exponentiation in
multiplicative groups)
Deﬁnition 2.3 Given an integer k and a point P in a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, the elliptic scalar
multiplication kP is the result of adding P to itself k times.
Deﬁnition 2.4 The order of a point P on an elliptic curve is the smallest positive integer
r such that rP = O. If k and l are integers, then kP = lP if and only if k  l(mod r).
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Deﬁnition 2.5 The number of points of E(F), denoted by #E(F) is called the curve
order of the curve E(F).
Deﬁnition 2.6 The trace Tr() is the linear map from F2m to F2 deﬁned by
Tr(a) =
m 1X
i=0
a2
i
:
Proposition 2.7 Let E be an elliptic curve ofer a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq. Then:
 Hasse’s theorem states that #E(Fq) = q + 1   t, where jtj  2pq. That is, the
number of points in E(Fq) is approximately q.
 If q is a power of 2, then #E(Fq) is even. More speciﬁcally, #E(Fq)  0(mod 4) if
Tr(a) = 0, and #E(Fq)  2(mod 4) if Tr(a) = 1.
 E(Fq) is an abelian group of rank 1 or 2. That is, E(Fq) is isomorphic to Zn1Zn2,
where n2 divides n1 and q   1.
 If q is a power of two and P = (x; y) 2 E(Fq) is a point of odd order, then the trace
of the x-coordinate of all multiples of P is equal to the trace of the parameter a.
That is, Tr
 
x(kP )

= Tr(a) for each integer k.
2.2.2 Koblitz curves
These curves, also known as binary anomalous curves, are elliptic curves over F2m with
coeﬃcients a and b either 0 or 1. Since it is required that b 6= 0, they are deﬁned by the
equations
E0 : y
2 + xy = x3 + 1 and E1 : y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1:
Proposition 2.8 If (x; y) is a point on Ea; a = 0 or 1, so is the point (x2; y2). Moreover,
every point P = (x; y) 2 Ea satisﬁes the relation
(x4; y4) + 2P =   (x2; y2);
where  = ( 1)1 a.
By using the Frobenius map over F2 : (x; y) = (x2; y2), this can be written as
(P ) + 2P = P; for all P 2 Ea:
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2.3 Elliptic curve cryptography
Unlike the ordinary discrete logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem, no
subexponential-time algorithm is known for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
For this reason, the strength-per-key-bit is substantially greater in an algorithm that uses
elliptic curves. Thus, smaller parameters, but with equivalent levels of security, can be
used with elliptic curve cryptosystems than with discrete logarithm systems.
2.4 Digital signature schemes
2.4.1 Generalities
Digital signature schemes are designed to provide the digital counterpart to handwritten
signatures (and more). A digital signature is a number dependent on some secret known
only to the signer (the signer’s private key), and, additionnaly, on the contents of the
message being signed. Signatures must be veriﬁable - if a dispute arises as to whether an
entity signed a document, an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter
equitably, without requiring access to the signer’s private key. disputes may arise when
a signer tries to repudiate a signature it did create, or when a forger makes a fraudulent
claim.
We speak here about asymmetric digital signature schemes with an appendix. “Asym-
metric” means that each entity selects a key pair consisting of a private key and a related
public key. The entity maintains the secrecy of the private key that it uses for signing
messages, and makes authentic copies of its public key available to other entities which
use it to verify signatures. “Appendix” means that a cryptographic hash function is used
to create a message digest of the message, and the signing transformation is applied to
the message digest rather than to the message itelf.
Security. Ideally, a digital signature scheme should be existentially unforgeable under
chosen-message attack. This notion of security asserts that an adversery who is able to
obtain entity A’s signatures for any message of its choice is unable to successfully forge
A’s signature on a single other message.
Applications. Digital signature schemes can be used to provide the following basic cryp-
tographic services: data integrity (the assurance that data has not been altered by uau-
thorized or unknown means), data origin authentication (the assurance that the source of
data is as claimed), and non-repudiation (the assurance that an entity cannot deny previ-
ous actions or commitments). Digital signature schemes are commonly used as primitives
in cryptographic protocols that provide other services including entity authentication,
authenticated key-transport and authenticated key agreement.
Classiﬁcation. The digital signature schemes in use today can be classiﬁed according to
the hard underlying mathematical problem which provides the basis for their security:
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1. Integer factorization (IF) schemes, which base their security on the intracibility of
the integer factorization problem. Examples of these include the RSA and Rabin
signature schemes.
2. Discrete logarithm (DL) schemes, which base their security on the intractability of
the (ordinary)discrete logarithm problem in a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Examples of these include
the ELGamal, Schnorr, DSA, and Nyberg-Ryppel signature schemes.
3. Elliptic curve (EC)schemes, which base their security on the intractability of the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
2.4.2 The Digital Signature Algortihm (DSA)
The DSA was proposed in August 1991 by the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and was speciﬁed in a U.S. Governement Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS 186) called the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The DSA
can be viewed as a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme. Its security is based on the
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in prime-order subgriuops of Zp.
DSA domain parameter generation. Domain parameters are generated for each entity
in a particular security domain.
1. Select a 160-bit prime q and a 1024-bit prime p with the property that qjp  1.
2. (Select a generator g of the unique cyclic group of order q in Zp)
Select an element h 2 Zp and compute g = h(p 1)=q mod p. (Repeat until g 6= 1.)
3. Domain parameters are p; q and g.
DSA key pair generation. Each entity A in the domain with domain parameters (p; q; g)
does the following:
1. Select a random or pseudorandom integer x such that 1  x  q   1:
2. Compute y = gx mod p.
3. A’s public key is y; A’s private key is x.
DSA signature generation. To sign a message m, A does the following:
1. Select a random or pseudorandom integer k; 1  k  q   1.
2. Compute X = gk mod p and r = X mod q. If r = 0 then go to step 1.
3. Compute k 1 mod q.
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4. compute e =SHA-1(m).
5. Compute s = k 1fe+ xrg mod q. If s = 0 then go to step 1.
6. A’s signature for the message m is (r; s).
DSA signature veriﬁcation. To verify A’s signature (r; s) onm, B obtains authentic copies
of A’s domain parameters (p; q; g) and a public key y and does the following:
1. Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1; q   1].
2. Compute e =SHA-1(m).
3. Compute w = s 1 mod q.
4. Compute u1 = ew mod q and u2 = rw mod q.
5. Compute X = gu1yu2 mod q and v = X mod q.
6. Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
Security analysis. Since r and s are each integers less than q, DSA signatures are 320
bits in size. The security of the DSA relies on two distinct but related discrete logarithm
problems. One is the discrete logarithm problem in Zp where the number ﬁeld sieve
algorithm applies; this algorithm has a subexponential running time. More precisely, the
expected running time of the algorithm is
O

exp
 
c+ o(1)

(ln p)1=3(ln ln p)2=3

; (1)
where c  1; 923 and lnn denotes the natural logarithm function. If p is a 1024-bit prime,
then the expression (1) represents an infeasible amount of computation; thus the DSA
using a 1024-bit prime p is currently not vulnerable to this attack. The second discrete
logarithm problem works to the base g in the subgroup of order q in Zp: given p; q; g and
y, ﬁnd x such that y  gx( mod p). For large p (e.g., 1024 bits), the best algorithm
known for this problem is Pollard’s rho method and takes aboutp
q=2 (2)
steps. If q  2160, then the expression (2) represents an infeasible amount of computation;
thus the DSA is not vulnerable to this attack. However, note that there are two primary
security parameters for DSA: the size of p and the size of q. Increasing one without a
corresponding increase in the other will not result in an eﬀective increase in security. Fur-
thermore, an advance in algorithms for either one of the two discrete logarithm problems
could weaken RSA.
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Secure generation of parameters. In response to some criticisms received on the ﬁrst
draft, FIPS 186 speciﬁed a method for generating primes p and q “veriﬁably at random”.
This feature prevents an entity (e.g., a central authority generating domain parameters to
be shared by a network of entities) from intentionally constructing “weak” primes p and
q for which the discrete logarithm problem is relatively easy. FIPS 186 also speciﬁes two
methods, based on DES and SHA-1, for pseudorandomly generating private keys x and
per-message secrets k.
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